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I am ever tending toward nothing.
—The Imitation of Christ, III.40
Gregory of Nyssa is famous for defending both the doctrine of epekta- 
sis, the continual ascent of the blessed toward God, and, in places, the 
doctrine of apokatastasis, the eventual restoration to God of all creation, 
including the Devil. This is a curious conjunction, for while Gregory con- 
nects them more than adventitiously, the tradition of the Eastern Church 
has largely received the former and rejected the latter.1 The point of this 
essay is to follow that intuition, not to say inspiration, of the tradition: 
briefly to challenge Gregory's conjunction and to develop from that chal- 
lenge and with certain currents in philosophy of religion a conception of 
hell that is consistent with epektasis, avoids the implications of apokatasta- 
sis, and is itself attractive—which is to say, appropriately repulsive.
This will not be an attempt to reconcile epektasis with Western escha- 
tology. The best such effort may be present, incipiently, in Maximus the 
Confessor's impossible "moving rest,"2 itself a synthesis of the dynamic 
suggestions of Gregory with the static and sabbatical emphasis of the late 
Platonists, the early Origenists, and the Latins. This will also by its nature 
be closer to what philosophers call a "theodicy" than to what they call 
a "defense": more a plausible attempt at filling out the truth—here not 
the why but the what of hell—than a demonstration of certain doctrines'
Ross McCullough, Yale University, Department of Religious Studies, PO Box 
208287, New Haven, CT 06520-8287. E-mail: ross.mccullough@yale.edu
1. Epektasis continues to appear up through Palamas (see, for instance, Triads, II.3.35), 
whereas apokatastasis largely falls out of favor with the sixth-century condemnations of 
Origenism.
2. See, e.g., Amb. 67, Q. Thai. 59, 65.
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logical coherence. I care to describe hell, darkly and in part, not to defend 
the mere compatibility of some two of its attributes. Here also Maximus 
gives the keynote: "It is not a matter of refuting the opinions of others, 
but of presenting one's own; not a matter of contesting some aspect of the 
teaching or behavior of others that seems not to be good but of writing on 
behalf of the truth."3
EPEKTASIS AND APOKATASTASIS
Although the doctrine of epektasis has antecedents in the ante-Nicene 
Fathers and in the other Cappadocians,4 it receives its most articulate 
treatm ent in Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory bases the idea of perpetual 
progress on the principle that the desire for God is never satisfied, ex- 
panding even as it is fulfilled. He writes of the follower of God: "He is 
still unsatisfied in his desire for more. He still thirsts for that w ith which 
he constantly filled himself to capacity, and he asks to attain as if he had 
never partaken, beseeching God to appear to him, not according to his 
capacity to partake, but according to God's true being."5 Passages like 
this ring w ith Gregory's own spiritual experience, but the idea is in his 
philosophical as well as his spiritual-ascetic works.6 In Against Euno- 
mius, for instance, it is grounded in Gregory's more general philosophi- 
cal claims about creation's dependence upon God:
For to the Godhead it properly belongs to lack no conceivable thing which 
is regarded as good, while the creation attains excellence by partaking in 
something better than itself; and further, not only had a beginning of its 
being, but also is found to be constantly in a state of beginning to be in 
excellence, by its continual advance in improvement, since it never halts at 
what it has reached, but all that it has acquired becomes by participation 
a beginning of its ascent to something still greater, and it never ceases, in 
Paul's phrase, "reaching forth to the things that are before, and forgetting 
the things that are behind" (Phil 3:13)7
3. In Epistulam Dionysii 6, quoted in Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Uni- 
verse according to Maximus the Confessor, trans. Brian Daley (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2003), 60.
4. See Everett Ferguson, "God's Infinity and Man's Mutability: Perpetual Progress ac- 
cording to Gregory of Nyssa," Greek Orthodox Theological Review 17, nos. 1-2 (1973): 60-61.
5. Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, translated by Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett 
Ferguson (N ew  York: Paulist Press, 1978), 114 [par. 230],
6. For a brief analysis of the scholarship on the place and motivations of epektasis in 
Gregory and its relationship to his spiritual doctrine, philosophical theology, and criticism 
of Origenism, see Paul M. Blowers, "Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the 
Concept of 'Perpetual Progress,"' Vigiliae Christianae 46, no. 2 (1992): 151-53.
7. Against Eunomius, VIII, NPNF V, 210.
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The ascent is perpetual because its object is infinite:
The First Good is in its nature infinite, and so it follows of necessity that 
the participation in the enjoyment of it w ill be infinite also, for more will 
be always being grasped, and yet something beyond that which has been 
grasped will always be discovered, and this search will never overtake its 
Object, because its fund is as inexhaustible as the growth of that which 
participates in it is ceaseless.8
For our growth to be ceaseless, it is not enough that our object be infinite; 
our capacity to receive it must be capable of indefinite expansion. This, too, 
Gregory asserts: "Such are the wonders that the participation in the Divine 
blessings works: it makes him into whom they come larger and more capa- 
cious; from his capacity to receive it gets for the receiver an actual increase 
in bulk as well, and he never stops enlarging."9 Or more briefly, "Activity 
directed toward virtue causes its capacity to grow through exertion."10
This ability endlessly to pursue the good, grounded in the infinity of 
God and therefore goodness, is matched by an inability endlessly to pur- 
sue evil in its finitude.
N ow  that which is always in motion, if its progress be to good, w ill never 
cease m oving onwards to what lies before it, by reason of the infinity 
of the course to be traversed:—for it w ill not find any limit of its object 
such that w hen it has apprehended it, it w ill at last cease its motion: but 
if its bias be in the opposite direction, when it has finished the course of 
wickedness and reached the extreme limit of evil, then that which is ever 
moving, finding no halting point for its impulse natural to itself when it 
has run through the lengths that can be run in wickedness, of necessity 
turns its motion towards good: for as evil does not extend to infinity, but is 
comprehended by necessary limits, it w ould appear that good once more 
follows in succession upon the limit of evil; and thus, as w e have said, the 
ever-moving character of our nature comes to run its course at the last 
once more back towards good.11
Good is infinite and can be enjoyed forever; evil, bounded by good, 
can be indulged only so far before being exhausted. Here we see the 
connection between epektasis and apokatastasis: what makes perpetual 
progress possible, the limitlessness of good, is also that which by limiting 
evil determines the outcome of the peregrinations of the lost. W ander in 
wickedness long enough and you will reach its end, which can only give 
out upon the good.12 Elsewhere Gregory suggests an anthropological
8. Against Eunomius, I, NPNF V, 62.
9. On the Soul and the Resurrection, NPNF V, 453.
10. Life of Moses, 113 [par. 226],
11. On the Making of Man 21:2, NPNF V, 410f.
12. See Jean Danielou, L'etre et le temps chez Grégoire de Nys se (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 196-97.
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basis for this limit to the pursuit of evil: "The desire for anything harm- 
ful is transitory and insubstantial. It is alien to man right from the start, 
whereas that [good] alone with which we are familiar and are on intimate 
terms is both desirable and agreeable."13 Evil desire is unnatural desire, 
and unstable: no wickedness can become perpetual because we sooner or 
later come to our senses. This is matched by the stability of the natural de- 
sire for God that grounds perpetual progress, from whose good sense we 
never defect: "The heart flies upw ard through its stability in the good."14 
Thus apokatastasis complements epektasis metaphysically, due to evil's 
finitude and good's infinity, and anthropologically, as the instability of 
natural desires yields to the stability of the pursuit of God.
THE UNMAKING OF MAN
I do not mean to synthesize these anthropological and metaphysical ac- 
counts but to work from a weakness they share. For while Gregory de- 
fends the expansion of the capacities of those approaching God, he puts 
less emphasis on the parallel condition of those receding from God: the 
diminution and corruption of the dam ned's capacities by sin. Apokatas- 
tasis is a possibility only if we retain sufficient intellectual and volitional 
capacities at the end of our descent into evil to recommit ourselves to the 
good.15 But this is by no means clear, especially if we work, as Gregory 
does, with data from the spiritual life: while our experience of the good 
shows that our "appetite is extended with the participation,"16 our experi- 
ence of evil reveals even more markedly an erosion of the very capacities 
required to regain the right path. Gregory acknowledges this erosion, 
of course,17 and it explains why the exploration of evil that precedes 
apokatastasis consists not in the maunderings of chance but in a descent 
through "the course of wickedness" to "the extreme limit of evil."18 Each 
step down the course confirms us ever more in our blindness and hard­
13. Concerning Those Who Have Died, trans. Richard McCambly (accessible at h ttp :// 
w w w .sage.ed u /facu lty /sa lom d /n yssa /), section J.57. For an analysis of this account, see 
Jerome Gaith, La conception de la liberté chez Grégoire de Nysse (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 137-42.
14. Life of Moses, 118 [par. 244]. Some see Gregory's use of epektasis to be motivated at 
least in part by a desire to secure an eschatological stability that the Origenist system  lacked. 
See Blowers, "Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of 'Perpetual 
Progress,"'152f.
15. Especially, for Gregory, a sense of shame. See Gaith, La conception de la liberté chez 
Grégoire de Nysse, 139f.
16. On Ecclesiastes 2.
17. E.g., Concerning Those Who Have Died, J.57: "If w e freely debase ourselves through pas- 
sion, w e w ill desire to do harm in the future."
18. On the Making of Man 21:2, NPNF V, 410. Note that in other places Gregory suggests 
that the evil are not so much making a single-minded descent but seeking to ascend upon  
shifting ground and so failing to make progress (e.g., Life of Moses, 243-44). Whether this is
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heartedness. But in appending apokatastasis to the descent, Gregory as- 
sumes that we reach the bottom of evil still free to return to the good. He 
assumes, in brief, that we exhaust evil without also exhausting ourselves.
But what if there is no demonstration or Dante or deus ex machina to 
open a door from the basement of hell into the vestibule of heaven? What 
if persisting in perverse desires, however unstable, eventually prevents 
our reversion to the more stable passions? What if the finitude of evil is 
measured not against the infinite good but against the finite evildoer, and 
our descent kills us before it can save us? I suggested that one's mind on 
these issues is influenced by one's spiritual experience, and the difficulty 
with the spiritual experience of the saints is that it may sometimes be too 
felicitous to inspire this sense of an irreversibly evil course. Fortunately 
there is the Western Church, whose genius lies in producing saints inti- 
mately familiar with evil, and whose critics, though they might question 
how far it sees into heaven, do not doubt it sees rather far into hell.
That sin could kill is a possibility held open by Paul Griffiths, who 
works from an insight in the greatest of such Western saints, though 
indeed it is shared by most of the Fathers. Griffiths notes that for Augus- 
tine, sin is the diminution by misuse of the soul's capacities, a diminution 
whose logical end is destruction. "Were a particular soul to become so 
damaged that it lost, irretrievably, freedom, the capacity to know, and 
the capacity to form dispositions and act upon them, it would, simply, 
cease, and with it would cease the hum an being of which it is a part."19 
Augustine denies that it will quite come to that, refusing the conclusion 
that we are finally annihilated either by our own hand or God's, but 
his logic of participation suggests that such is the end of the way of the 
wicked. "The fact that you are is sheer unmerited gift, and what you are is 
a participant in God. Sin is the rejection of gift, and thereby the rejection 
of participatory being. The result is loss of a properly ontological sort. 
. . . This proliferative loss eats away at the soul, causing the progressive 
loss of distinctive properties (freedom, choice, judgment, understanding, 
virtuous habit, and so on) to the point where the soul returns to that from 
which it came: nihil, nothing, the void, simple absence."20
Still, it is not clear that we can actually reach the point of nothing- 
ness. Even granting that sin erodes one's being by diminishing one's 
essential capacities, why should we think that loss could be total and 
those capacities could be destroyed?21 Perhaps we should not—it is hard
a separate class of sinners or an alternate description of the descent or sim ply an equivoca- 
tion is not clear.
19. Paul Griffiths, "Self-Annihilation or Damnation? A Disputable Question in Christian 
Eschatology," in Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn, ed. Paul J. Weithman (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 89-90.
20. Griffiths, "Self-Annihilation or Damnation?" 92.
21. This case is made against Griffiths by Claire Brown and Jerry Walls, "Annihilation- 
ism: A Philosophical Dead End?" in The Problem of Hell: A Philosophical Anthology, ed. Joel 
Buenting (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010), 47-53.
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to know how long a leash God gives us in these things without looking 
to revelation, which will be discussed more below—but note that even 
so we have enough to sever Gregory's connection between epektasis and 
apokatastasis. The only way to descend without annihilation is never fully 
to exhaust those capacities whose exhaustion is a symptom of sin; it is 
never fully to plumb the depths of evil, which would be destruction. Evil, 
in Gregory's scheme, may still be limited, but then its exploration must 
be acknowledged to sap progressively the energy of the explorer so that 
she never reaches its limits. Sin corrupts both the force and the direction 
of her will: confirmed ever more in her blindness, laboring ever more for 
that which does not satisfy, she turns more and more to evil with less and 
less effect.22 Dissolute, involute, her growing self-absorption is matched 
only by a growing frailty. The accelerating progress of those in heaven, 
whose possession spurs them on with greater capacity and greater desire, 
is then matched not by a descent with a saving peripety but by an indefi- 
nite, decelerating inanition that never quite kills the damned, but never 
can save them, either.23
This view, indeed, has much to recommend it. Epektasis is based on 
Gregory's belief, disputed by some in the West, that our having-come- 
into-being implies a changeableness in our nature that persists in heaven 
as perpetual change for the good.24 But the scholastics had no problem 
acknowledging mutability in the damned. Indeed, as Thomas says, the 
damned are properly speaking still in time.25 Though he takes this to 
mean that they suffer a succession of punishments rather than what 
Griffiths, reading Augustine, calls a "diminution toward nonexistence, 
the dying fall of a diminuendo that will (or may) end in silence,"26 still 
their basic temporality would allow this sort of perpetual fall away from 
God. That desire expands when fulfilled, which is the motive force of 
epektasis, might be disputed by those Western Christians who would see 
in heaven our capacities entirely engaged and our desires entirely satis- 
fied. But as Griffiths represents, no one in the Augustinian heritage—no 
one with a doctrine of the Fall—would deny that the turn from God that 
is consummated in hell involves not only disengaging our capacities but
22. "So [the mind] turns away from [God] and slithers and slides dow n into less and less, 
which it imagines to be more and more." Augustine, De Trinitate, 10.5.7.
23. In On Infants' Early Deaths (NPNF V, 378), Gregory mentions that Judas could experi- 
ence eternal purgative chastisements. Whether this eternal purgative process might be ef- 
fectively indistinguishable from an eternal destructive process is not clear, and as Gregory 
does not explore his suggestion in any way systematically, it is hard to know what to make 
of it or its relation to apokatastasis.
24. See Ferguson, "God's Infinity and Man's Mutability," 68f.
25. "The fire of hell is called eternal only because it never ends. . . .  In hell true eternity 
does not exist, but rather time." ST 1.10.3 ad 2.
26. See Griffiths, "Self-Annihilation or Damnation?" 91.
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their real diminishment. Hell, like the sin which is its seed, is not just a 
failure to look upon God but a loss of our very clear-sightedness; it is 
both the misuse and the destruction of our freedom. It is ontological loss, 
if not through continued postmortem sin then through the progressive 
actualization of that decisive break with God that happens at the Judg- 
ment. The damned have chosen, finally, for the idols, and out of respect 
for their free choice, God allows them to become more and more like what 
they have made.27
For those with the Aristotelian fever, who take their medicine in sub- 
stance and accident, a useful parallel is Thomas's account of divinization. 
For as in that great mystery we participate accidentally in a form that 
makes little sense unless understood (in some extended sense) at the level 
of substance—Form, or the form of God—so here we are participating 
accidentally and increasingly in the dissolution of substantial form. That 
we never finally realize these substantial changes substantially, and that 
the exact nature of their accidental application therefore remains unclear, 
is as much a charge against the adequacy of the empyreal explanation 
as against the infernal one. And the charge is just, for these are not very 
clean explanations—but then our subject does not admit of cleanliness. It 
is clear that we can take on accidentally the essential properties of others, 
as water takes on an essential property of fire when it is heated. And it 
is clear that our essential properties can be expanded or occluded, if not 
destroying us then at least rendering us unrecognizable, as gods or beasts. 
But what exactly that looks like—whether the damned are being frozen 
into lifelessness like those in Dante's final circle or, like Tolkein's ring 
wraiths, withering away from all that makes them men without thereby 
forsaking their humanity—is a subject that cannot be much explicated on 
this side of the veil.
This is all to say that the picture of hell sketched here coheres with 
broader Christian claims about ontology, mutability, and evil. But why 
should this ontological loss be progressive? Why not a hell in which each 
sinner is locked into that degree of attenuated being that she has chosen 
for herself? There are two reasons a specifically progressive view is attrac- 
tive: the second will be suggested below, after some remarks on temporal- 
ity; the first has to do with general intuitions about justice.
Traditional views of hell and its eternity have long faced a propor- 
tionality objection: how is it just for God to punish finite sins with infinite 
suffering? How is it just to set up an order in which the mistakes of a
27. H ow this actualization is progressive is explored more below. Note that though I have 
framed this idea largely with hell as a natural consequence of sin, the sort of progressive 
annihilation I sketch here could equally w ell be conceived in terms of God's active punish- 
ment of sinners.
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short and nescient life result in limitless torment? The common tradi- 
tional answer is that our continued defiance in hell justifies the continued 
suffering it entails: the soul turned from God gets only what it deserves, 
for every moment it deserves it, and this happens to endure forever. 
The immediate rejoinder is that those in hell traditionally conceived 
cannot turn back toward God, and it hardly seems just to be punished 
for actions you can in no way avoid. Some indeed hold a mild form of 
escapism—defending the ability of the damned to leave hell, however 
improbable—on precisely these grounds.28 But we need not go so far as 
the escapists, for we can grant that the suffering of the damned is ever- 
lasting without granting that it is infinite. In particular, if the damned are 
forever diminishing, it is reasonable to think that their ability to suffer 
diminishes as well. What Christ calls the destruction of both soul and body 
in hell presumably includes the destruction of those sensory faculties 
that mediate between the two, as it also includes the destruction of those 
cognitive capacities that allow mere pain to be experienced as suffering. 
As Dr. Johnson remarks, "He who makes a beast of himself gets rid of the 
pain of being a man." While we may not always see sinners' physical fac- 
ulties diminish in this life, the spiritual observer will remark something 
of their cognitive and volitional corruption,29 and the biblical account 
of the Fall suggests that sin does indeed have physical consequences, 
w ith hagiography suggesting as much of sanctity. Granted, then, that 
our ability to suffer diminishes in hell, and that the amount of suffering 
diminishes correspondingly, it is entirely plausible that hell last forever 
without its torments exceeding a finite limit.30
28. See, e.g., Charles Seymour, A Theodicy of Hell (Dordrecht: Springer, 2000), 88-89. A  
sort of apokatastasis could be sm uggled through the possibilities opened by escapism, though 
Seymour notes the power of habit in confirming us in hell. So long as we exist, God could 
presumably give us the prevenient grace necessary to make our return to blessedness pos- 
sible; one way to construe the tradition's disavowal of escapism is to hold that hell includes 
the decisive rejection of even this sort of grace, which we are not given the ability to reject 
decisively before the judgment. For the case that God w ould not remove this grace from us, 
that the divine attributes suggest that escape w ill be made available even to those in hell, 
see Andrei Buckareff and Allen Plug, "Escaping Hell: Divine Motivation and the Problem 
of Hell," Religious Studies 4: 39-54.
29. I am not making a public claim here; I am not saying the uncommitted observer can 
discover empirically the truth of this statement. Nor do I defend my larger premise that 
these capacities depend for their excellence on our right relationship with God, and for their 
existence on a bare relationship with him, except to note that this is traditional.
30. By the mathematics of convergent series. James Cain defends the compatibility of suf- 
fering's infinite duration and finite overall sum by means of the theory of relativity, but his 
suggestions are somewhat bizarre and are meant only as a possible scenario showing the 
noncontradiction of the two ideas. See James Cain, "On the Problem of Hell," Religious Stud- 
ies 38: 355-62. Cain dismisses the idea of a suffering of diminishing intensity on the grounds 
that it w ould eventually grow small enough to no longer be a barrier to overall happiness, 
which is presumably not allowed to the damned. He does not consider that the intensity of 
the suffering might diminish in a way that does not allow for its replacement by happiness, 
as for instance by a diminishment of our ability both to enjoy and to suffer.
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We might still worry that the punishm ents of the dam ned are not 
proportionate to the evils done in this life. The traditional view of hell 
contains punishm ents of varied intensities, from mere loss of beatitude 
to serious torment, bu t if all are punished by a sort of progressive de- 
struction, can we preserve this variegation? Indeed, w ouldn 't those who 
enter hell as worse sinners end up suffering less, since they are already 
closer to death, as it were, w ith capacities for suffering already dimin- 
ished? But this is to assume a closer connection between torment and 
ontological loss than necessarily obtains. One's diminished capacities 
may put an upw ard limit on the amount of torm ent one can experience 
at any given time, but those w ith greater capacities for suffering need 
not actually suffer more. The traditional poeni sensus, the pains of sense, 
can be added or subtracted as justice requires from the poeni damni, the 
pains of loss shared by all in hell. It is entirely possible that the espe- 
dally vicious are visited with an especially vicious destruction when 
God destroys the destroyers of the earth; and conversely, it may even be 
possible that some suffer their destruction w ithout torment, as those in 
limbo are said to be separated from God without any "pains of sense." 
The difference I am suggesting lies not in the poeni sensus but in the poeni 
damni, expanding the latter beyond the loss of the beatific vision to in- 
elude also the loss of being that separation from God is taken to entail. 
On this suggestion, our freedom extends farther than was traditionally 
supposed, and the decisive decision for or against God that results 
in heaven or hell includes within it a decision for or against our very 
existence. This destructive hell w ould be a harsher hell, for it robs us 
progressively of that existence which is a good, but its harshness stems 
from and is justified by a larger scope for our free choice.31
ANNIHILATIONISMS
So far I have tried to suggest a conception of hell attractive to those who 
want to hold onto the traditional doctrine of everlasting suffering and 
who give weight to traditional authorities like Gregory and Augustine 
and to traditional Christian philosophical positions like the privative 
view of evil. This conception is a sort of progressive annihilationism; but 
there are also Christians who deny aspects of the traditional position and 
defend a strict annihilationism, holding that the damned cease to exist 
altogether in the post-judgment state.
31. Eleonore Stump argues that some such compensatory justification is needed to justify 
the destruction of the damned precisely because destruction is an additional evil added to 
our punishment. "Dante's Hell, Aquinas's Moral Theory, and the Love of God," Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (1986): 181-98.
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Here something must be said about time. I have spoken of hell as if 
it were a continuation of time, even citing Thomas on the point, but that 
may just be an approximation: hell is a mirror of heaven, in some respects 
duplicating and in some respects contradicting it, and its timepieces too 
are reverse images of their celestial counterparts. The similarity is implied 
in Matthew 25:46, where the eternity of the one is matched to the eternity 
of the other: "And they will go away into eternal punishment, but the 
righteous into eternal life."32 Of course, these cannot be the exact same 
sort of eternity, for the eternity of the life of the blessed is traditionally 
taken to come by participation in God's eternity, and not so the wicked: 
the eternity of their punishment must come instead from being cut off and 
unremembered by the Lord. This is why Thomas, in the passage quoted 
above, takes hell to be a sort of extended temporality, reading its eternal- 
ity as everlastingness.
But this is not the only way to understand the progression of progrès- 
sive annihilation. Hans Urs von Balthasar writes,
In this context w e are only concerned with the different kinds of timeless 
duration, which can become mutually opposed depending on whether 
there is a participation in, or a depriving of, divine eternity. The man 
who, in God, contemplates him is participating in a mode of being that 
"includes all time within it" (aetemitas includit omne tempus). If he is 
excluded from the contemplation of God and from a participation in the 
Divine Being, he is also excluded from this includit and so is restricted to 
the timelessness of his ow n being, deprived of all contact with God and 
with his fellow creatures. Such a restricted being is stripped of all those 
"dimensions" that characterize the living and that God possesses in an 
infinite degree: it is thus a dead nunc stows.33
The annihilationist dissatisfied with the scholastic picture might take the 
eternity of hell in this way: not as eternity in its proper sense, of the single 
"now" in which God views all of creation; nor as the sort of everlasting- 
ness that suggests infinite future time, like ours in all but its endlessness; 
nor even as eternity in its participated sense, the aeviternity of the medi- 
evals, a mean between God and temporality; but rather as a sort of sub- 
ternity, a falling away from God and the created time that is in God.34 This 
is not straightforwardly describable, but if we must characterize it, we 
might say that it is a sort of frozen moment, the final moment, an activity 
without succession. It has neither before-and-after nor does it come to an
32. For more on the exegetical debate, see below.
33. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. 5 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 
306-7.
34. The medieval idea of aeviternity is motivated by the notion that time itself, as part of 
creation, is som ehow elevated or drawn closer to God in the new creation. Sub-ternity is the 
inverse of that.
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end. It is everlasting, if pictured temporally, or instantaneous, if pictured 
as the end of time, and the two held together by a chimera of gerund and 
progressive participle: for the damned, it is a dying, an eternal moment of 
death. They will be as Dante in the final, frozen ring of hell, who "did not 
die, and did not remain alive."35
W hat this is not is pure nonexistence. The dam ned are dying: they 
have not died, nor are they yet to die. Theirs is the moment of death, 
falling timelessly from God's sustaining presence, as the old King James 
Version of the angelic oath is fulfilled: that there should be time no longer 
{oti chronos ouketi estai). For the annihilationist to remain in continuity 
with historical orthodoxy, he need only affirm that there is no point at 
which the damned are no more, that, to adapt a phrase from the Arian 
controversies, there will be no time at which they are not. God does not 
judge, and kill (or let die), and contemplate the corpses; God judges the 
damned, and kills them, and contemplates their dying. This is where the 
strict annihilationist demurs, but she need not dem ur to remain true to 
her annihilationist instincts: she can affirm the death of the damned, so 
long as it is death everlasting. She need only say with the Psalmist that 
though the wicked sprout like grass and all evildoers flourish, they are doomed 
to destruction for ever.
A progressive annihilation need not adopt this progressive participle 
approach; it can insist upon a consistent—the ultimate just like the im- 
mediate—temporality; it can take infernal eternity as infernal everlast- 
ingness instead of sub-temity; it need not make von Balthasar's turn, but 
it can do so. How to understand the temporality of progression is left 
open by the mere claim that destruction is progressive. Successive loss of 
our capacities suggests how suffering might be both eternal and finite: a 
loss that is not successive and everlasting but sub-ternally instantaneous 
should a fortiori be able to accommodate the same combination. The first 
suggests an infinite addition of moments whose overall sum is finite; 
the second suggests a finitude, because a singularity, of moments. But 
I would suggest that the latter option is closer to what annihilationists 
want in their annihilation. There is at least this difference: to say that we 
are constantly dying in the sense of successively losing our capacities is to 
suggest that we never really die; to say that we are frozen in a moment of 
death suggests that we do die, but there is no moment beyond it. In that 
sense, the second death is more nearly like the first: not just the erosion 
of capacities, which after all happens in this life and is not properly called 
death, but some sort of passing from existence.36
35. Inferno, Canto XXXIII.25 (Carlyle translation).
36. In the first death it is the body-soul union that passes from existence; for some, at least, 
this is sufficient to say that "I" pass from existence. Here it is body and soul and union that 
pass away, though again, unlike the first death and pace strict annihilationism, there is no 
moment of "having passed from existence."
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This is to allude to the exegetical grounds of annihilationism, and 
here something must be said about Scripture, whose interpretation is at 
the center of the debate between annihilationists and traditionalists. It is 
beyond my purposes to survey and settle that exegetical debate, but three 
points might prove helpful in laying a biblical ground for the suggestions 
that have so far been advanced.
First, exegetical answers are constrained by the perceived philosophi- 
cal options. The exegete takes it as her task to bring the figures and con- 
tradictions of Scripture to something nearer a univocal, propositional 
statement—there is a hell of such-and-such a character—and the sorts 
of propositions deemed sufficiently stable and pellucid for this task will 
depend on philosophical explication. Second, the New Testament, which 
is more explicit about the afterlife than the Old, uses language suggest- 
ing both destruction and eternality.37 Sometimes the two are joined, as 
in 2 Thessalonians 1:9: "They shall suffer the punishment of eternal de- 
struction and exclusion from the presence of the Lord." And while some 
of this language can easily be read to imply a one-off act with eternal 
consequences, as with the term "eternal judgment"38 or indeed "eternal 
destruction," there are also cases where the instrument of punishment is 
itself described as eternal—eternal fire,39 or the worm that does not die 
and the fire that is not quenched40—and the eternal-consequences reading 
is rather more strained.
Third and consequently, the exegetical work tends to degenerate 
quickly into ambivalence over whether to prioritize eternality or de- 
struction.41 As Joseph Leckie observed some years ago, "We become 
involved in a debate about the meaning of a few ambiguous words and 
of two or three pictorial expressions. We are constrained to balance very 
little evidence on the one side against very little on the other."42 Because 
the philosophical options are seen as either eternal punishm ent on the 
one hand or destruction and subsequent nonexistence on the other, the 
exegete is torn between the biblical language that suggests the first and 
the biblical language that suggests the second, and the impossibility of
37. See, e.g., on the annihilationist side, E. Earle Ellis, Christ and the Future in New Testa- 
ment History (Boston: Brill, 2001), 190-95, esp. 193; and on the traditionalist, Christopher W. 
Morgan, "Biblical Theology: Three Pictures of Hell," Hell under Fire (Grand Rapids: Zonder- 
van, 2004), 142-48.
38. Heb 6:2.
39. E.g., Jude 7.
40. Mark 9:48. Christ is there quoting Isa 66:24.
41. The exegetes are not always tentative, but their confidence flies in the face of Scrip- 
ture's ambivalence. For a comprehensive survey of the N ew  Testament evidence that brings 
out this ambivalence, with a cautiously annihilationist conclusion, see David J. Powys, 
“Hell": A Hard Look at a Hard Question; The Fate of the Unrighteous in New Testament Thought 
(Carlisle, UK: Paternoster Press, 1998), esp. chs. 7-11.
42. The World to Come and Final Destiny (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1922), 111.
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reconciling the two in a straightforward way is grounded not in scrip- 
tural but in philosophical testimony.
But what if the philosophical barrier is illusory, the hallucinations of a 
vain desire for an afterlife that can be modeled neatly in our minds, and 
thence in our words? What if exegesis tempers its conclusions not with 
uncertainty but—what is not at all the same thing—with apophasis? It 
is not clear what sub-temal existence actually means, nor how it might 
incorporate activity, frozen or otherwise, nor how a binary transition like 
dissolution, moving from a moment of existence to a moment of nonexis- 
tence, can itself be characterized as a moment to be frozen forever. Some 
of this confusion is just uncertainty, an invitation to further reflection 
based on a more substantial metaphysics of time, for instance. But some 
of our discomfort springs from the suspicion that these questions will 
never yield clear answers. This is precisely why Gregory's thought is a 
useful foundation, not just because it is persistently apophatic—before 
this darkling light there was his "luminous darkness"43—but also because 
his eschatology reminds us in the West that the broader tradition equivo- 
cates over those future states that eye has not seen and ear has not heard. 
We should like to demand of the damned—as indeed of the blessed—that 
they be either within time or without, as those are conditions of which 
we can roughly conceive. But Gregory suggests another way: perhaps 
the best we can do is say that they are neither temporal nor eternal and 
construct safeguards against those who would incline to one affirmation 
or the other. Perhaps the way forward constructively is to conjoin two in- 
adequate and contradictory conceptions, each the other's implicit denial, 
as with talk of activity without succession. For in so doing we produce 
a third conception, not describable in the way that the first two are, in- 
deed only describable by something like this impossible conjunction, but 
emerging nonetheless. What I have tried to suggest here (and this is the 
second reason I find a specifically progressive annihilationism attractive) 
is that there is a kind of traditionalist position that can do justice to both 
sides of the scriptural ambivalence—not by speaking tentatively, which 
is caution, nor by refraining from speech, which is agnosticism, but by 
speaking in diverse and scarcely reconcilable ways, which is paradox 
pointing toward apophasis.
It is a traditionalist position: I do not pretend that it is the exact posi- 
tion of Augustine or the medievals, say; it is not what those who talked of 
perpetual suffering in the tradition really meant. But it accommodates tra- 
ditional insights with less of the artful dodging of those, like Griffiths, who 
try to read a strict annihilationism into line with historical orthodoxy. Even 
if what has been suggested here is not the exact conception of someone like 
Thomas, it has certain commendable features that his position lacked—not
43. Life of Moses, 95 [par. 163].
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least a harmony with those other aspects of orthodox thought that have 
generated the annihilationists' discontent. In that way, it is a challenge to 
the more traditional position, asking, why not annihilationism? In another, 
stronger way, it asks the balder artnihilationists, why not traditionalism? 
What justifies continued dissent from the mass of Christians' interpretation 
of Scripture on this point?44 Why not a death that descends away from God, 
or a dying beyond successive time? Or as Augustine puts it, if not in quite 
the way Augustine means it, why not a state in which we "will not be be- 
fore or after death, but always in death; and thus never living, never dead, 
but endlessly dying?"45 Finally, perhaps, the blackest mark against this 
view is that it does not make perfect sense; but its greatest recommenda- 
tion is that, in following Scripture over the edge of hum an reason, it is not 
supposed to. As Augustine also says of hell, "It cannot be concluded that a 
thing has not been or shall not be because it cannot be reconciled to reason. 
. . .  So those things we speak of are not impossible because inexplicable."46
44. Some root their support for annihilation in the idea that God's majesty w ould be 
offended by the continued disobedience of those in hell (see, e.g., Clark Pinnock, "The 
Conditional View," in Four Views on Hell, ed. William Crockett [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
1996], 154-55.) Interestingly, Thomas argues for the preservation of the damned on similar, 
and similarly vague, grounds: "Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the 
manifestation of grace, since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the 
preservation of things in being" (ST I. 104.4 corpus). Whether annihilation or preservation 
more befits God's nature is hard to determine: as Griffiths says, "Judgments about what 
does and what does not lack convenientia are notoriously difficult to assess" (Griffiths, "Self- 
Annihilation or Damnation?" 109). Brown and Walls argue that the extinction of the damned 
is not needed to protect divine majesty, see Brown and Walls, "Annihilationism," 61-63.
45. City of God, XIII.ll.
46. City of God, XXI.5.
